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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Montgomery appeals from the district court’s Judgment – Suspended
Execution. Mr. Montgomery was found guilty of unlawful discharge of a firearm at an
occupied motor vehicle.

On appeal, Mr. Montgomery asserts that the district court

abused its discretion when it allowed the State to present the testimony of two nondisclosed rebuttal witnesses.

He asserts that the district court misinterpreted the

language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6), stating that the State must disclose all witness that may
testify, regardless of whether they will testify. While Idaho Courts have previously held
that the State does not have to disclose rebuttal witnesses, these cases are based
solely upon the now amended statute, I.C. § 19-1302, and are either not binding
precedent, as they are not based upon an analysis of the Idaho Criminal Rules, or must
be overturned.
Additionally, Mr. Montgomery asserts that the prosecution committed misconduct
when the prosecutor repeatedly made unfounded statements during closing that
Mr. Montgomery and his witnesses had lied during their testimony. The prosecutorial
misconduct was not objected to; however, Mr. Montgomery asserts that the misconduct
amounted to fundamental error, that it was not harmless, and that his conviction must
be overturned.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s assertions that the district
court could not have applied law that had not yet been enacted in determining whether
to allow the State’s non-disclosed rebuttal witnesses to testify; that the plain language of
I.C.R. 16(b)(6) does not require the disclosure of the State’s rebuttal witnesses; and that
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statements made by the prosecuting attorney, during closing augments, that defense
witnesses had lied, were merely proper inferences based upon the evidence presented
at trial. Mr. Montgomery does not offer reply to the State’s remaining arguments as they
are unremarkable and no further argument is necessary.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Montgomery’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State’s nondisclosed witnesses to testify on rebuttal?

2.

Did the State violate Mr. Montgomery’s right to a fair trial by committing
prosecutorial misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The State’s Non-Disclosed
Witnesses To Testify On Rebuttal
The State has asserted that the district court followed relevant law in making the
decision to allow the non-disclosed witnesses to testify, arguing that the district court
could not follow law that had not been enacted. (Respondent’s Brief, p.8.) While the
district court was aware of prior case law holding that the State was not required to
disclose rebuttal witnesses, presumably, the district court was also aware of the plain
language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) and case law that holds that the Rule must be applied as it
was written. Further, defense counsel provided the district court with the language
contained in a footnote in State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 589 n. 2 (Ct. App. 2015),
which directly called into question prior case law supporting the proposition that the
State was not required to disclose rebuttal witnesses.

(Tr., p.391, L.13 – p.395, L.24.)

As such, the law regarding the required disclosure of the State’s witnesses had both
been enacted and highlighted by the appellate court’s expressed concerns with the
precise issue before the district court.
Further, after conceding that the appellate court must evaluate I.C.R. 16 using
the plain language of the rule1, the State asserted that “the plain language of I.C.R.
16(b)(6) and logic support the conclusion that the rule does not require disclosure.”

“Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, the appellate court must give
effect to the rule as written, without engaging in construction. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho
641, 642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462,
988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000)).”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.16.)
1
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(Respondent’s Brief, pp.16-17.) The relevant portion of Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6)
states that, “[u]pon written request of the defendant the prosecuting attorney shall
furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and addresses of all persons having
knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial . . .”
Mr. Montgomery maintains that the plain language does not provide for any exception
for the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses.
The State premised its argument that the plain language did not require
disclosure of witnesses on the phrase “who may be called by the state.” (Respondent’s
Brief, p.16.) The Respondent asserts that, “the state must only disclose the names of
witnesses it will probably or possibly call in order to meet its burden of proof.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.16.) This argument flies in the face of Rule 16(b). The State has
blatantly skipped over the requirement that they “shall” furnish the list of witnesses,
instead focusing on the word “may” found later in the rule.

I.C.R. 16(b)(6).

Rule

16(b)(6) does not stand for the proposition that they State “may” disclose witnesses that
it “may” call. Instead, it requires the State to disclose “all” witnesses that may testify at
trial. I.C.R. 16(b)(6). The “may” in the Rule allows the State the opportunity to later
choose to not present a witness’s testimony at trial. The “may” is in no way a method
for the State to avoid its disclosure responsibilities. Further, contrary to the State’s
assertion otherwise, there is also no limit to the Rule that only witnesses offered to
“meet [the State’s] burden of proof” must be disclosed.
While there may be an argument that requiring the State to disclose all rebuttal
witnesses is impractical, those arguments would be more properly presented in support
of an effort to change the Rule. Under the current version of I.C.R. 16(b)(6), those
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arguments carry no weight. The plain language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) is clear, and under
the plain language, the State is required to disclose “all” witnesses.

As such,

Mr. Montgomery asserts that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State
to present the testimony of two non-disclosed rebuttal witnesses.
II.
The State Violated Mr. Montgomery’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The State has asserted that the prosecutor’s statements that Mr. Montgomery
and several of his witnesses had lied were fair assertions based upon the evidence.
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.23-27.) Mr. Montgomery maintains that the comments were
more than assertions based upon the evidence and constituted prosecutorial
misconduct.
The State has asserted that because defense witnesses’ testimony of the events
of the night in question were not 100% accurate, it was merely a comment on the
evidence when the prosecutor pointed out the discrepancy between their testimony and
the video recording and then continued by calling them liars. While it would have been
proper to comment that the video accurately portrayed the series of events that evening
and that most witnesses that night were incorrect in their memory of the events, it was
not a proper comment on the evidence to accuse only defense witnesses of lying. As
noted in the Appellant’s Brief, if a person’s memory of an event is not exactly the same
as a video recording of the events, this does not mean that the logical conclusion is that
a person lied while they were testifying.
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Mr. Montgomery and his witnesses, like the witnesses from the State, testified
regarding their memory of events that had transpired nearly a year prior.

No witnesses

for the State testified to the events of the altercation exactly as they occurred.
Mr. Newell did not remember the Jeep making contact with Mr. Montgomery.
(Tr., p.135, Ls.13-24.) Ms. Haddorff testified only that the Jeep began rolling forward
and as it drove off, Mr. Montgomery started shooting at the vehicle. (Tr., p.159, L.22 –
p.160, L.20.) Ms. Detar stated that as the Jeep inched forward, Mr. Montgomery moved
out of the way, and then began shooting at the vehicle as it drove away. (Tr., p.176,
Ls.6-11.) As such, none of the State’s eyewitnesses recalled that the Jeep had struck
Mr. Montgomery. Despite their testimony, the video clearly showed Mr. Montgomery
being struck by the vehicle. (State’s Exhibits 8 and 9.) However, the State failed to
comment on this evidence or characterize its own witnesses as liars, as one might have
expected, if the prosecution was merely making assertions based upon the video
evidence from the trial.
Instead, the prosecution chose to paint only defense witnesses as liars.

It

ignored that both Mr. Decker and Mr. Megis qualified their testimony as being based on
their memories of the events. (Tr., p.285, L.20-22; p.311, L.23 – p.312, L.3.) The
prosecution failed to mention that, while Ms. Montgomery testified that she thought that
her husband had been run over and killed (Tr., p.250, Ls.19-22), something that clearly
did not occur; defense Exhibit A shows that, when the events transpired,
Ms. Montgomery did believe her husband had been seriously injured (Defense Exhibit
A). And, only a nefarious interpretation was provided when Mr. Montgomery explained
that he knew his statements would be later clarified by the video and he was making his
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initial statements to police from his recollection of events. (Tr., p.347, L.15 – p.348,
L.5.) The State characterized each of these witnesses, not just as proven incorrect by
the videos, but as liars: “[Mr. Decker] lied to you. . . . [Ms. Wills] lied to you. . . .
[Mr. Megis] lied to you, too. . . . Mr. Montgomery’s wife took the stand and lied to you. . .
. Ladies and gentleman, you heard Mr. Montgomery lie to you.” (Tr., p.460, L.10 –
p.461, L.11, p.467, Ls.6-7.)
The comments were not made as fair inferences based upon the evidence. If
that was the case, comments that the video showed what actually occurred were all that
were necessary or proper.

Instead, the prosecution’s comments were designed to

inflame the jurors and malign the credibility of the defense witnesses (the only
witnesses singled out for their partially inaccurate memories of the events that evening).
Calling the witnesses liars was more than a proper comment on the evidence or
inferences to be drawn therefrom. The prosecutor’s statements crossed the line and
constitute

prosecutorial

misconduct.

This

prosecutorial

misconduct

deprived

Mr. Montgomery his right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Montgomery respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his
case remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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